In a recent opinion piece in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Evelyn Hu-DeHart reflected on the paradoxical situation of Ethnic Studies as an academic discipline--paradoxical because it is both widel -r endorsed and universally ignored, long-established but marginalized. Why this co existence of being both blessed and maligned at the same time? All Departments of Ethnic Studies, to be sure, have experienced the anxi eties of in-betweeness and contingency, "trips" of indeterminacy. Their survival is nothing short of a miracle. Except that this miracle, seen in historical perspective, involves secular agents: the ordinary and daily acts of resistance by people of color against ostracism and various forms of oppression. I have in mind the mobilization of popular energies against discrimination and racist violence throughout United States history--a
tive of oppression and opposition now mystified by the model minority myth, allows us to grasp the flaws of the liberal pluralist focus on culture divorced from the politi cal and economic contexts of unequal power relations.
Ultimately, for whom is Ethnic Studies designed? By historicizing identity politics and validating the geneal ogy of resistance, we in the field of Ethnic Studies can refuse to be mere apologists for the status quo and re vitalize the critical and emancipatory thrust of Ethnic Studies, a thrust inseparable from the struggle of people of color against white supremacy.
In a recent opinion piece in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Evelyn Hu-DeHart reflected on the paradoxical situation of Ethnic Studies as an academic discipline--paradoxical because it is both widel -r endorsed and universally ignored, long-established but marginalized. Why this co existence of being both blessed and maligned at the same time? All Departments of Ethnic Studies, to be sure, have experienced the anxi eties of in-betweeness and contingency, "trips" of indeterminacy. Their survival is nothing short of a miracle. Except that this miracle, seen in historical perspective, involves secular agents: the ordinary and daily acts of resistance by people of color against ostracism and various forms of oppression. I have in mind the mobilization of popular energies against discrimination and racist violence throughout United States history--a dialectic of forces that have constituted the polity from its founding. The birth of Ethnic Studies in the fury of emergencies , in the fires of urban rebellions and national liberation struggles inscribed within living memory, has marked its character and destiny for better or worse, perhaps to a degree that explains the risks and the stakes in this peculiar (to use Wittgenstein's term) "form of life."
We are witnessing today a fateful turn of events in the politics of local/g lobal cultures as we cross the threshold into the 21 st century. While its viabil ity and provocativeness still draws sustenance from the profound historicity of its advent, the current plight of Ethnic Studies also depends on the conjuncture of circumstances. It depends chiefly on the sense of responsibility of such "organic" intellectuals to their communi ties. Everyone recognizes that this discipline would not have been pos sible without the rad ical democratic engagements of women, youth, people of color in "internal colonies" and overseas dependencies--projects to achieve cultural autonomy, sovereignty rights, and self-determination. One might say that our field is concerned with the theorizing of such variegated praxis. 2 With the neoconservative counter-revolution of the eighties, such condition of possibility may have been extinguished, hence the ambiva lent and even amphibious mapping of this field. Hu-DeHart is sorely pressed to argue for its scholarly legitimacy and respectability, thus she tries to reinvent its reformist "contract" with society by invoking the some what triumphalist claim that Ethnic Studies is here to stay because "it is an integral part of multicultural education." I do not mean to ascribe a naive optimism to Hu-DeHart; her view is partly substantiated by demo graphics and the revitalized opposition to the neoconservativism of the last two decades. Ethnic Studies will stay so long as its practitioners adhere chiefly to the power/knowledge regime of the "role model" and regard this subject-position as the pedagogical transcoding of the cha meleonic politics of identity (otherwise variably known as "border," hy brid, and cyborg lifestyles). The routine slogan for these role models, I believe, goes like this: "Look, marvel at our inimitable crafts, perfor mances, apparel, idioms--we contribute to making America a colorful saladbowl of differences!" Angela Davis rightly objects to this cooptative management of diversity for corporate profitmaking, incapable of chal lenging the gender, class and race hierarchies that structure the major institutions: "A multiculturalism that does not acknowledge the political character of culture will not...lead toward the dismantlin B of racist, sex ist, homophobic, economically exploitative institutions."
Meanwhile, I want to provoke here an exploratory reflection on these themes of telos and commitment in this time of cynical reaction and retrenchment by posing the following questions: If multicultural educa tion (for some, the "cult of literacy") has displaced the centrality of mass social movements, does this signify that we have again been subtly re-San Juall-Beyolld Ethllicity colonized? Has the "power elite" (to use C.Wrig ht Mills' oldfashioned term) succeeded in obscuring fundamental inequalities (class, gender, nation) by shifting the attention to cultural differences, lifestyles, and the quest for authentic selves? Has ethnic pluralism erased racism? Is the generic brand of Ethnic Studies and its discourse of dive rs ity, with its associated politics of identity, not problematizing Others of its own in vention? Is it now simply used to manage and harmonize differences by refurbishing the trope of the "melting pot"? Has it been retooled to per form what Marcuse once called "repressive desublimation"? Or is it de ployed as prophylaxis to seNice the aspirations of the comprador intel ligentsia of the subalterns and ultimately pacify the populace? 4 I want to briefly address these questions in the context of the Asian American situation in the period of late or global capitalis m. As numer ous scholars (Elizabeth Martinez and Annette Jaimes Gue rrero, S among others) have argued in examining the complex racial politics of U.S. history, we can no longer continue to use the white/black sociological paradigm to understand how the racialization of Latinos, Native Ameri cans, Asians/Pacific Islanders, and other groups in this country has op erated to establish, reproduce and maintain EuroAmerican hegemony. For one, the 1992 Los Angeles multiethnic rebellion, labelled "riots" by the mass media, escapes this functionalist paradigm. 6 I propose the axiom of historical specificity and the methodological primacy of mate rial social relations to guide us in apprehending how the value or mean ing of ethnicity (ethnic identity, etc.) cannot be fully grasped without the overall framework of the political economy of race in U.S. history. Ex cept for proponents of the "Bell CUNe" and other reactionary theories, the term "race" has (by the consensus of the scholarly community) no scientific refere nt. It is a socially constructed term embedded in the struc tures of power and privilege in any social formation. Its signifying power comes from the articUlation of a complex of cultural properties and pro cesses with a mode of production centered on capital accumulation and its accompanying symbolic economy. This system depends primarily on material inequality in the appropriation and exploitation of land, labor power, and means of re product ion by a privileged minority of European origin or affiliation. The historical genealogy of the United States as a peculiar settler formation with internal colonies and subjugated subal terns is, I submit, the necessary framework within which one should chart thelostCold War vicissitudes of late-capitalist Herrenvolk de mocracy.
By the year 2000, ten million people of Asian and Pacific Islander descent will be residing here. This is part of a demographic trend in which the racial minorities (always conceived as a problem to the domi nant majority) are bound to become the majority in the next four or five decades--a shocking and frightening prospect for a preponderant mul titude of citizens who still cling to the assimilationist melting-pot of yore . Globalizing trends, howeve r, contain both homogenizing and heterogenizing impulses.
By 2020, Asians/Pacific Islanders will reach a total of twenty million. 8 But chances are that even with this phenomenal increase, Asian Ameri cans (the government rubric homogenizes more than 30 distinct groups) in general will still "look alike" to the majority. Such a will to classify "them" versus "us" is not of course a natural disposition but a crafted scapegoating response that has become normalized. 9 It is the resent ment felt by the casualties of economic devaluation and social disloca tion: someone (who looks or behaves diffe rently, the "strangers" in our midst) ought to pay for the crisis we are in. I cite only the most well known example. In 1992, two unemployed white autoworkers in Detroit mistook Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, fo r Japanese and clubbed him to death. Chin's father was a World Wa r II veteran, and his grandfa ther was one of the thousands of Chinese who built the transcontinental railroads in the 19th century.
About a hundred years ago, the first federal law targetting a racially denominated group, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (not repealed until 1943), was passed after years in which the Chinese served as sacrifical offerings--to lynchmobs. 10 (Note that California passed the first law in 1858 barring Chinese and "Mongolians"). "Kill the foreigners to save our jobs! The Chinese must go!" were the demands of unions in California before and after 1882. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, is famous for his statement: "Every in coming coolie means the displacement of an American, and the lower ing of the American standard of living." What needs underscoring is some thing marginalized in the textbooks: Ever since the 1790 Naturalization Law, which specified that only free "white" immigrants would be eligible for naturalized citizenship, a racially exclusive and not simply ethnic pattern of development became ascendant.
Just as landmark cases like Dred Scott vs Sanford ( 1857) and Plessy vs Ferguson ( 1896) registered the ideological effects of racial struggles in the past, so we find analogous developments concerning Asians. This racially exclusivist drive to discipline Asian bodies, inflamed by economic crises and sharpening class antagonisms, influenced the laws reinforc ing the 1882 Exclusion Act, the 1907-08 Gentlemen's Agreement, and finally the 1917 and 1924 legislation of the "barred zone," which prohib ited the entry of all Asians, including those in the Asian part of Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Arabia, and the Pacific and southeast Asian Islands not owned by the United States. The "ba rred zone" law is, I think, a unique milestone in the annals of territorial purification. Clearly, the state was neither neutral nor paternalistic in the racialization of Asians. I need not recapitulate here the narratives of brutalization of these Asian sub jects all of which have been plotted by the discursive and disciplinary practices of an order geared to facilitate commodity exchange and sur-plus-value accumulation. John Higham's Strangers in the Land 11 and Gustavus Myers' History of Bigotry in the United States, 12 among oth ers, offer substantive documentation for this entire epoch.
Up to World War II, then, Asians here were perceived as "perpetual foreigners" because of their physiognomy and therefore had to "stay in their place." They were considered "unassimilable," recalcitrant, and in tractable, because of either language, customs, religious or political be liefs--in short, their appalling victimage and their refusal to submit. Ethnicity acquired meaning and import within the existing class hierar chy and the vicissitudes of its internal antagonisms. The historian Sucheng Chan sums up the effects of state ideological and coercive apparatuses that circumscribed the location of Asians in the racialized order: "In their re lationship to the host society, well-to-do merchants and poor servants, landowning farmers and propertyless farm workers , ex ploitative labor contractors and exploited laborers alike were considered inferior to all Euro-Americans, regardless of the internal ethnic and socio economic divisions among the latter. ,, 13 When 112 ,000 Japanese Ameri cans were "relocated" to conce ntration camps in 1942, this surveillance and confinement of bodies climaxed almost a century of racial politics initiated with the near extermination of the American Indian nations, re fined in the slave plantations of the South, and extended after the Mexi can-American War of 1846-48 to Mexicans and indigenous inhabitants of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines.
Va rious historians have pointed out that we cannot understand the economic and geopolitical expansion of the United States nation-state without constantly keeping in mind the physical displacement of masses labelled "Others", and the political subjugation of dark-skinned peoples by the civilization of white supremacy. 14 The notion of cultural pluralism is rooted in and complicit with the permanence of systemic inequality. The Enlightenment principles of equality and individual rights constituted the abstract logic that legitimized the commodification of human bodies (chattel slavery) and the predatory forays of the "free market." Eventu ally, white supremacy and ethnocentrism acquired pseudo-scientific le gitimacy with the rise of social Da rwinism and the tradition of racist thinking begun by Carl Linnaeus and elaborated by Robert Knox, Arthur de Gobineau, Francis Galton (founder of eugenics), Herbert Spencer, Hous ton Stewart Chamberlain, and their numerous American counterparts. When the majority of Asians entered U.S. territory after the Civil War and the pacification of the Native Americans in the West, they entered a space where their subjectivity was mediated if not produced by the inter pellation of capital. The boundaries of domination over Asian and Ha waiian bodies exceeded the circumscribed geography of the nation-state when the U.S. annexed Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines as colonies by the turn of the century. The Cold War interventions in Ko rea in the fifties and Vietnam in the sixties and seventies explain the influx of refugees, war brides, orphans, and the "brain drain" from those unsettled regions now targetted for global modernization by transnational corporations. (And mind you, these transnational entrepreneurs are not reading Max Weber's theory of modernization but Sun Tzu's Art of War15 and other guerilla manuals from medieval Japan.) Has the margin then become the center, or the center marginalized?
Distinct from other Asians, the Filipinos experienced the full impact of U.S. colonization as "wards" of the government's Bureau of Indian Af fairs. The violent subjugation of the Philippines and its revolutionary re public after the brief Spanish-American War (at the cost of at least 8,000 U.S. soldie rs and about a million natives--a blank space in most history textbooks) gives us the background to the heterogeneous and incoher ent nature of the Filipino community here in the U.S. (now the largest of the Asian American category). When queried why the American conduct of the war had been cruel, Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana replied: "Senators must remember that we are not dealing with Americans or Europeans. We are dealing with Orientals ... .', 16 Such an "Orientalist" remark has often been repeated from then on up and through World War II (against the Japanese). the Korean War, and the interventions in IndoChina.
It should now be obvious that the ethnicity of Asian Americans cannot be understood apart from history, the workings of the state, and the con tingencies of political economy. We need to comprehend the effects of the racializing dynamics of business politics and the resonance of mod ernization ideology in the colonizing maneuvers of the government around the world. Because international rivalries of nation-states (despite postCold War compromises) affect ethnic/racial boundaries and their realignments in the United States, I would also urge a comparative ap proach in examining the racializing of ethnic relations across class and gender lines, among European immigrants and their descendants, as well as the dominated peoples of color, in relation to power disparities and conflicts.
We must remember that the incorporation of Asians and Pacific Is landers occurred in times of fierce class wars (articulated through race) from the beginning of the Civil War, the subjugation of the American Indian nations and the Mexican inhabitants of the occupied southwest region, up to the imperialist encroachments into Latin America, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Ideology and jurisprudence followed the logic of capital expansion and colonial administration. State power and ideologi cal apparatuses of civil society functioned within this wider framework to determine the shifting value of ethnic properties (or whatever salient cultural attrib ute is defined as "ethnic" at a given conjuncture) within the dynamics of fundamental and subsumed class contradictions.
What this implies then is that in rehearsing the narratives of victim ization of Asians in the United States, a task that seems to have stigma-San JlIan-Beyond Ethn icity tized US as experts in the putative science of victimology, we need to beware of the traps of liberal patronage. I think it is not enough to simply add that we possess a rich archive of resistance and rebellion. There may be something suspect in claiming that the Chinese or Japanese movement, in seizing the guarantee of equal protection under the Constitution's Fou rteenth Amendment to redress grievances, blazed the trail for the Civil Rights movement--a global phenomenon that embraced national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Or cel ebrating the fact that Japanese and Filipinos spearheaded strikes and militant union organizing in Hawaii and California from the beginning of this century up to the founding of the United Farm Worke rs of America. Such occasions (too numerous to inventory here) demonstrate how re sistance to capital overcomes ethnic separatism and segregation.
Ethnicism, the absolutizing or mystification of ethnicity, occludes racism and delegitimizes resistance to it. We need instead to avoid reifying cultural traits and show how such allegedly fixed and static attributes change under the pressure of circumstances and the transformative force of people's actions. What is imperative is to historicize the so-called ethnic predicament--the salience of cultural practices, customs, tradi tions, languages, and so on, in situations of uprooting, surveillance, alien ation, exclusion, violence--by inscribing the rac ial marking of Asian bod ies and their labor power in the unevenly synchronized but universaliz ing narratives of the growth, consolidation, and expansion of U.S. capi tal in the continent and around the wo rld. 17 This leads us to inquire into the function of the now infamous "model minority myth" which, despite being exposed and exploded by numer ous critiques that begin to replicate each other, exhibits a curious buoy ancy and seems to enact the "return of the living dead" in some comic, late-night TV melodrama.
Initiated principally by pund its of the mass media, this myth was can onized by President Reagan in 1984 and then echoed by Newsweek, CBS, and current textbooks. Reagan praised Asians for their high me dian family incomes ostensibly due to their "hard work" and idiosyncratic "values" that are allowed to flourish within " our political system" of free enterprise and self-help utilitarianism. Some Japanese Americans and Asian Indians have "outwhited the whites," so to speak. Time here for bids me from reiterating the massive fallacies of such ascription, falla cies belied by facts about the spatial distribution of Asians, number of workers per family, the "glass ceiling" fo r Asian mobility, labor-market segmentation resulting in bipolar status, and so on. Discrepancies exist between effort and achievement, between achievement and reward , enough to expose the disingenuous and genuinely tendentious manipu lation of selected d ata. Deborah Woo comments: "By focusing on the achieve ments of one minority in relation to another, our attention is di verted from larger institutional and historical factors which influence a Explorations ill Ethllic Studies Vo l. 18, No. 2 group's success. Each ethnic group has a diffe rent history, and a sim plistic method of modeling which assumes the experience of all immi grants as the same ignores the sociostructural context in which a certain kind of achievement occurred.,, 18 This critique is, howeve r, double edged. Such highlighting of differences, while useful in questioning the claims of hegemonic standards of representation, fails to attack the nerve center of capital itself, its substantive ke rnel which insidiously--like the proverbial trickster of indigenous folklore--thrives in the reproduction of novelty, hybridity, and multiplicity fashioned under its aegis.
Again we need to contextualize and ground such propositions in cur rent realities. This new stereotype of America's "preferred minority" must of course be placed within the intense class warfare of the eighties that established the groundwork fo r today's "Contract With America" for de stroying the so-called evils of the welfare state. This raging class war coincides with the decline of U.S. hegemony in the international economy (given its trade imbalance and its change from creditor to debtor nation), the rise of what some scholars call the "underclass," the precipitous deterioratio n of the white middleclass, and other symptoms of social decay. In a deindustrializing milieu where poverty, homeless ness and alienation have worsened, this myth is meant to breathe new life into the consensual ideology of individual success, "habits of the heart" or re ceived commonsense all presumably learned in undertaking the Puritan "errand into the wilderness."
What needs emphasis, I submit, are the uses to which this "model minority myth" has been deployed. First, it reinforces the homogenizing mechanisms of the state and the disciplinary institutions that reduce diverse individuals into one classified, sanitized, uniform "minority. " Sec ond, it obscures the presence of disadvantaged Asians and blocks any help for finding employment, learning English, and so on. Third, it serves the "divide-and-rule" strategy of the system by pitting one racialized group against another. If Asians can achieve the American "Dream of Suc cess" by dint of internalizing a work ethic, why can't poor blacks and whites on welfare? It is crucial to keep in mind that the sweatshops in the garment and computer industries, as well as the service sectors , are inhabited more and more by a predominantly multiethnic workforce, thus requiring a more sophisticated policing technique.
Et hnicity and racializing technologies of governance converge here. Ironically, the paradox of absolutizing certain elements of ethnic identity appears when Asians are conceived as both passive and aggressive, complacent and competitive, family-centered and individualistic. Pride in their heritage, family solidarity, fragments of Confucian morality, and so on are used to explain both upward and downward mobility, sporadic recognition and endemic disadvantage, appreciation and resentment. Meanwhile, as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report of 1992 indi cates, incidents of hate-crimes, bigotry, denial of equal opportunity, and Now liberals have proposed that we need multicultural education to solve the contemporary crisis, one that would get rid of the basis of institutional racism and any form of "ethnic cleansing" such as the mur der of targeted populations. Everyone knows that the movement to re vise the Eurocentric canon and curriculum in order to allow the teaching/ learning of our society's cultural and racial diversity has been going on since the introduction of "Third World " and Ethnic Studies in the sixties. But one may ask: Has the formula of adding and subtracting texts, or even deconstructing the canonical discourses and hegemonic practices, really succeeded in elim inating chauvinist stereotypes and covert dis crimination, not to speak of institutional racism and genocidal policies? Do we really need a pedagogical strategy of commodifying cultural goods/ knowledges that consorts well with de facto apartheid in cities like Los Angeles, Atlanta, Detroit, Chicago, Miami, and others?
Like the nativists of old , present-day advocates of immigration re form as well as the sponsors of Proposition 187 in California contend that multiculturalism is precisely the problem. They believe that the "large influx of third -world people ... could be potentially disru ptive of our whole Judeo-Christian heritage." Multiculturalism even of the liberal variety is considered PC [politically correct) terrorism. It allegedly underm ines aca demic standards. Above all, like feminism, multiculturalism threatens Western civilization and its legacy of free enterprise, rationality, free speech, etc.
Stunned by the large immigrant flow from Latin America and Asia, Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming warned of the danger to national security: "If language and cultural separatism rise above a certain level, the unity and political stability of the Nation will--in time--be seriously eroded. Pluralism within a united American nation has been our great est strength. The unity comes from a common language and a core public culture of certain values, beliefs, and customs, which make us distinctly 'Americans.", 20 Pluribus, it seems, can be tole rated only by dispensation of the Unum. Diane Ravitch condemns ethnic particularisms (such as Afrocentrism) and insists on privileging "a common culture," precisely that culture which for all its claims to universality and objectiv ity sparked the protests and rebellions of the last four decades. 21 What Ravitch, Simpson, and others are actually prescribing is a return to the ideal of assimilation or integration couched in terms of diversity, a refur-
bished "melting pot" notion of community that would by some magical gesture of wish-fulfillment abolish exploitation, gender and racial inequal ity, and injustice. The renewed call by assorted fundamentalists to rally behind the flag--a nationalism coded in terms of fighting for freedom, democracy, human rights, and so on--is presented as a substitute for the comfort of ethnic belonging, but I think this can only restore the men ace of alienation and the scapegoating of the last half-century. It is also problematic to simply claim that we all benefit or suffer equally unless we see the mutual dependence of victimizer and victimized--the prover bial humanist nostrum of tolerance and love for one another pronounced at the conclusion of this weekend's sermon.
In the light of the historical conflicts surrounding the emergence of Ethnic Studies, Ramon Gutierrez emphasized certain "methodological principles" of the field derived from the intensive study of the histories, languages, and cultures of America's racial and ethnic groups in and among themselves. Aside from the situated and partial nature of all knowl edge claims, Gutierrez assumes a postmodernist stance in upholding the principle that "culture was not a unified system of shared meanings, but a system of multivocal symbols, the meanings of which were fre quently contested, becoming a complex product of competition and ne gotiation between various social groups.', 22 While I would agree that the focus of our discipline is comparative and relational--we explore com monalities and divergences in the experiences of racial and ethnic groups domestically and worldwide--this does not imply a thoroughgoing rela tivism or nominalism that would reduce history to a matter of equally suspect perspect ives or personal points of view. Such would be the ethnicist "insider's" approach. In analyzing the historical dynamics of race in the United States positioned in global and comparative grids, we are precisely grounding interpretations and judgments based on a con sensus of historians that is open to falsifiability. Otherwise, the "culture wars" based on ident ity politics would not only rule out dialogue but also all communicative action.
As a gloss on this, I would propose that instead of accenting cultural difference and its potential fo r bantustans, turf wars, liberal apartheid, and even worse "ethnic cleansing" (a cliche that has portentous reso nance for the field), we need to attend to the problem of power, the knowledge it produces and that legitimizes it, the uses of such knowl edge in disciplinary regimes, and its mutations in history. We need to examine not only the diverse cultures of multiple ethnic groups vis-a-vis the dominant society, the solidarities and conflicts among them, but also how ethn icity itself is linked to and reproduces the market-centered com petitive society we live in; how ethnic particularisms or selected cultural differences are mobilized not only to hide systemic contradictions but defuse the challenges and resistances integral to them. As Stephen Steinberg argues, no amount of glorifying ethnic myths and other cul-Sail Jllan-Beyond EtJlllicity tural symbols of identity can hide or downplay the inequality of wealth, power, and privilege in our society that underpins the production of knowl edge and the claims to objectivity and transcendent universalism. 23 In sight into such a foundation should not be taken as dogma but a heuris tic guide to counter essentializing of identities or utopianization of ethnicity. We cannot theorize the uneven terrain of contestation without a conceptualization of the totality of trends and tendencies. Neither privi leging the global nor the local, our approach should be dialectical and praxis-oriented so as to take up the inaugural promise of Ethnic Studies: to open up a critical space for enunciation by those who have been silenced--Paolo Freire's speechless subalterns, or Frantz Fanon's fes damnes de fa terre--within the horizon of a vision of a good and just society accountable to all. The question is: Can we imagine a different and better future for all?
Such a consensus on common purpose should not foreclose dis agreements or differences. What it safeguards in this period of nihilism or pragmatic relativism is the temptation of indulgence in playful self iro ny, infinite ambiguity or fluid polyvocality with the pretense that this is the most revolutionary stance against reaction and all forms of deter minism. In this time of so-called populist backlash, when the politicizing of citizens has been unleashed by the really "politically correct" officials and corporate philosophers, Gutierrez counsels us not to forsake the grand narratives: "At a moment when nationalism is reemerging power fully among students in the United States as well as many other nations and states around the globe, it seems imperative that we see that glori fication of local systems of knowledge which are rooted in racial, reli gious, and ethnic distinctions, as fundamentally tied to the globalization, commodification, and massification of social life. ,, 24 We need to investigate above all racism and the accompanying racial politics embedded in the everyday practices of business society, the interaction of racial ideologies with other categories like gender, sexu ality, locality, nationality, and so on, in order to cross the boundary be tween academic theory and practice in the real world. Unless we simply want to be used to peacefully manage the crisis of differences among the "natives" and reinforce the status quo ethos of liberal tolerance, "busi ness as usual," then the practitioners of Ethnic Studies need to be self critical of received ideas and be not just adversarial but oppositional in accord with its revolutionary beginnings, performing the role of (to quote James Baldwin) unrelenting "disturbers of the peace.,, 25
